Constitutional Amendment: Condorcet/Clone Proof SSD Voting Method

Time Line

Proposed: May 16th, 2003
Discussion Starts: Fri May 16 23:59:59 UTC 2003
Call For votes : Fri June 6 23:59:59 UTC 2003
Voting Ends: Fri June 20 23:59:59 UTC 2003

Proposer

Manoj Srivastava [[email protected]]

Seconds

  1. Joel Baker [[email protected]]
  2. Colin Walters [[email protected]]
  3. Ben Collins [[email protected]]
  4. Simon Law [[email protected]]
  5. Fabio Massimo Di Nitto [[email protected]]
  6. Bas Zoetekouw [[email protected]]
  7. Cesar Mendoza [[email protected]]
  8. Guido Trotter [[email protected]]
  9. Taylor C. Carpenter [[email protected]]
  10. Ian Jackson [[email protected]]

Text

In response to a query, Buddha Buck has provided a summary of the rationale for this GR. The actual text of the GR is: 

Under 4.2 Procedure [for developers during a general resolution or
election], change item 3 to read:

    3. Votes are taken by the Project Secretary. Votes, tallies, and
       results are not revealed during the voting period; after the
       vote the Project Secretary lists all the votes cast. The voting
       period is 2 weeks, but may be varied by up to 1 week by the
       Project Leader.

______________________________________________________________________

Under 5.2 Appointment of project leader, change item 7 to read:

    7. The decision will be made using the method specified in section
       A.6 of the Standard Resolution Procedure.  The quorum is the
       same as for a General Resolution (s.4.2) and the default
       option is "None Of The Above".

______________________________________________________________________

Under 6.1 Powers [of the technical committee], change item 7 to read:

    7. Appoint the Chairman of the Technical Committee.  The Chairman
       is elected by the Committee from its members. All members of
       the committee are automatically nominated; the committee votes
       starting one week before the post will become vacant (or
       immediately, if it is already too late). The members may vote
       by public acclamation for any fellow committee member,
       including themselves; there is no default option. The vote
       finishes when all the members have voted, or when the voting
       period has ended. The result is determined using the method
       specified in section A.6 of the Standard Resolution Procedure.

______________________________________________________________________

Under A.2 Calling for a vote, change items 2 and 4 to read

    2. The proposer or any sponsor of a resolution may call for a vote on that
       resolution and all related amendments.
    4. The minimum discussion period is counted from the time the last
       formal amendment was accepted, or since the whole resolution
       was proposed if no amendments have been proposed and accepted.

______________________________________________________________________

Replace A.3 with:

  A.3. Voting procedure

    1. Each resolution and its related amendments is voted on in a
       single ballot that includes an option for the original
       resolution, each amendment, and the default option (where
       applicable).
    2. The default option must not have any supermajority requirements.
       Options which do not have an explicit supermajority requirement
       have a 1:1 majority requirement.
    3. The votes are counted according to the rules in A.6.  The
       default option is "Further Discussion", unless specified
       otherwise.
    4. In cases of doubt the Project Secretary shall decide on matters
       of procedure.

______________________________________________________________________

Replace A.5 with:

  A.5. Expiry

   If a proposed resolution has not been discussed, amended, voted on or
   otherwise dealt with for 4 weeks the secretary may issue a statement
   that the issue is being withdrawn.  If none of the sponsors of any
   of the proposals object within a week, the issue is withdrawn.

   The secretary may also include suggestions on how to proceed,
   if appropriate.

______________________________________________________________________

Replace A.6 with:

   A.6 Vote Counting

     1. Each voter's ballot ranks the options being voted on.  Not all
        options need be ranked.  Ranked options are considered
        preferred to all unranked options.  Voters may rank options
        equally.  Unranked options are considered to be ranked equally
        with one another.  Details of how ballots may be filled out
        will be included in the Call For Votes.
     2. If the ballot has a quorum requirement R any options other
        than the default option which do not receive at least R votes
        ranking that option above the default option are dropped from
        consideration.
     3. Any (non-default) option which does not defeat the default option
        by its required majority ratio is dropped from consideration.
        a. Given two options A and B, V(A,B) is the number of voters
           who prefer option A over option B.
        b. An option A defeats the default option D by a majority
           ratio N, if V(A,D) is strictly greater than N * V(D,A).
        c. If a supermajority of S:1 is required for A, its majority ratio
           is S; otherwise, its majority ratio is 1.
     4. From the list of undropped options, we generate a list of
        pairwise defeats.
        a. An option A defeats an option B, if V(A,B) is strictly greater
           than V(B,A).
     5. From the list of [undropped] pairwise defeats, we generate a
        set of transitive defeats.
        a. An option A transitively defeats an option C if A defeats
           C or if there is some other option B where A defeats B AND
           B transitively defeats C.
     6. We construct the Schwartz set from the set of transitive defeats.
        a. An option A is in the Schwartz set if for all options B,
           either A transitively defeats B, or B does not transitively
           defeat A.
     7. If there are defeats between options in the Schwartz set,
        we drop the weakest such defeats from the list of pairwise
        defeats, and return to step 5.
        a. A defeat (A,X) is weaker than a defeat (B,Y) if V(A,X)
           is less than V(B,Y).  Also, (A,X) is weaker than (B,Y) if
           V(A,X) is equal to V(B,Y) and V(X,A) is greater than V(Y,B).
        b. A weakest defeat is a defeat that has no other defeat weaker
           than it.  There may be more than one such defeat.
     8. If there are no defeats within the Schwartz set, then the winner
        is chosen from the options in the Schwartz set.  If there is
        only one such option, it is the winner. If there are multiple
        options, the elector with the casting vote chooses which of those
        options wins.

     RATIONALE: Options which the voters rank above the default option
     are options they find acceptable.  Options ranked below the default
     options are options they find unacceptable.

______________________________________________________________________

Amendments

None recorded.

Quorum

With 804 developers, Q=14.1774468788, making a quorum of 42.5323406364, or, rounding up, 43.

Data and Statistics

Some statistics are being gathered about ballots and acknowledgements periodically during the voting period. Additionally, the list of people for the election is available. The tally sheet is also present.

Outcome

There were a total of 160 unique votes cast. 144 votes were cast in favour of the resolution, handily meeting the requirement of 42.53 (This makes for 3.3856589 times Quorum). The number of people voting against the resolution was 16. The resolution passes with a 9:1 super majority, which is in excess of the required 3:1 majority.
This resolution, thus, passes.

Manoj Srivastava